Metadata

• Authors: Gordon Pennycook, Jabin Binnendyk, David G. Rand
• Publication Date: [Publication date]
• Journal/Source: [Journal/Source]
• URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672251338358

Abstract

There is a pressing need to understand why people believe in conspiracies. Although past work has focused on needs and motivations, we propose an alternative driver of belief: overconfidence. Across eight studies with 4,181 U.S. adults, conspiracy believers consistently overestimated their performance on numeracy and perception tests (even after taking their actual performance into account). This relationship with overconfidence was robust in controlling for analytic thinking, the need for uniqueness, and narcissism, and it was strongest for the most fringe conspiracies. We also found that conspiracy believers—particularly overconfident ones—massively overestimated (>4×) how much others agree with them: Although conspiratorial claims were believed by a majority of participants only 12% of the time, believers thought themselves to be in the majority 93% of the time. This was evident even when asked to rate agreement among counter-partisans, indicating that conspiracists are genuinely unaware that their beliefs are on the fringe.

Key Findings

• Conspiracy believers consistently overestimate their abilities on numeracy and perception tests.
• Overconfidence among conspiracy believers is not mitigated by analytic thinking, the need for uniqueness, or narcissism.
• Conspiracy believers massively overestimate the level of agreement others have with their beliefs, believing they are in the majority 93% of the time, even though their beliefs are fringe.

Notes

• The study conducted eight studies involving 4,181 U.S. adults.
• Overconfidence remains a significant predictor of conspiracy beliefs, independent of other traits like analytic thinking and narcissism.
• The results highlight a disconnection between conspiracy believers’ perceptions and actual social consensus, contributing to their cognitive bias in evaluating agreement levels.